VANALSTYNE_FMT(3).DOC

03/20/03 3:43 PM

RECONCILING WHAT THE
FIRST AMENDMENT FORBIDS
WITH WHAT THE COPYRIGHT
CLAUSE PERMITS: A SUMMARY
EXPLANATION AND REVIEW
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE*
We need education in the obvious more than investigation of the obscure.
1

Oliver Wendell Holmes

I
INTRODUCTION
At least since an early article by Professor Melvin Nimmer in the 1970s,2
there has been some general agreement that Congress is fully within its proper
power to enact, pursuant to the Copyright Clause of Article I,3 an act that may
nonetheless be of a kind it is forbidden to enact because of the restraints placed
upon it by the Speech-and-Press Clause of the First Amendment.4 But just how
or why that can be so (or even that it is in fact so5) is not all that easy to explain.
Indeed, on the face of each respective clause, the First Amendment may well
quite reasonably be read to acknowledge that the Copyright Clause is a part of
the same Constitution. And, since it is, insofar as Congress stays within its
boundaries (that is, the “boundaries” furnished by the Copyright Clause itself),
it would arguably be perverse for a court to read the First Amendment as forCopyright  2003 by William W. Van Alstyne
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/66LCPVanAlstyne.
* William R. & Thomas S. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 292-93
(1920).
2. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech
and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970).
3. “The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
5. The Supreme Court has never held that an act of Congress adopted pursuant to the Copyright
Clause was either void on its face or invalid as applied on First Amendment grounds (as distinct from
being void on its face because of not being within the power actually granted by the clause). See also
Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 n.8
(2001) (“Recent cases have followed the view that copyright requires no external First Amendment
scrutiny.”) (emphasis added).
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bidding what the Copyright Clause declares is precisely within the authority of
Congress to do.
Of course, the First Amendment is later in time. But nothing on the face of
the First Amendment purports to affect the power granted to Congress pursuant to the Copyright Clause. So, again, one may say that whatever is properly
done by Congress within the permission of the Copyright Clause ought not be
said at the same time to be forbidden by some other part of the Constitution, at
least unless that “other part” so declares, or unless its express provisions are
simply incompatible with an earlier part it necessarily displaces and amends.
We have already noted that the First Amendment contains no such declaration
putting it at odds with the Copyright Clause. And certainly nothing on its face
suggests that it in any respect “amends” (that is, displaces) that clause.6 The
First Amendment is a general admonition—namely, that Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. The Copyright Clause
on the other hand is a very specific, enumerated power, expressly granting Congress discretion simply to secure to authors the exclusive right to their respective writings, albeit for limited times rather than in perpetuity. It would seem
again, on this basis as well, puzzling to declare that the First Amendment may
forbid something the more specifically “targeted” clause empowers Congress to
do. One may well suggest that this is another clear case where the useful
maxim, expressio unius, exclusio alterius est, appropriately applies.7
It happens I fully agree with those who say the First Amendment “limits”
what Congress may do pursuant to the Copyright Clause, despite the preceding,
introductory thoughts. Still, it has seemed to me that the obvious reason that
this is so has not yet been adequately explained or expressed. It is to that end
that this brief essay, and these quite summary remarks, are meant to be
addressed, with suitable thanks (and apologies) to Justice Holmes.
II
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER
Consider the following approach to relating the First Amendment to the
powers granted to Congress. We proceed in the following way—by noting that
the Constitution provides that: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the

6. There are of course amendments that do precisely this. Compare, for example, the provision in
the Seventeenth Amendment that Senators from each State shall be “elected by the people thereof,”
with the provision it displaces, in Article I, Section 3, that Senators from each State shall be “chosen by
the Legislature thereof.” Here, in the example just given, the respective provisions are at odds, and the
later in time means to displace the original provision. In contrast, the First Amendment does not
appear to be at odds, or in displacement of, the Copyright Clause (rather, it may be wholly “accepting”
of that clause).
7. Here, adapting the maxim appropriately, it would stipulate that “what is expressly given to
Congress to do, is by necessary implication excluded from the provision specifying what Congress is
forbidden to do.”
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freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”8 Although, to be sure, we note that the
Constitution also provides that: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes . . . .”9 As we readily agree, as well, that according to the Constitution, Congress shall also have Power: “To promote the Progress of Science
and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”10
So, now to start in the simplest way, with our first case. If the act of Congress is one that presumes to abridge “the freedom of speech or of the press,”
we agree that it is void pursuant to the prohibitory terms of the First Amendment (that is, the law is one prohibited to Congress and such a law, being prohibited, is to be given no force of law in the courts). If, on the other hand, the
act of Congress is merely one that presumes to regulate some aspect of commerce—whether “with foreign nations,” or “among the several states,” or “with
the Indian Tribes”—it is an act plainly authorized by the Constitution, within
the grant of power expressly conferred upon Congress, and it is to be given the
force of law in the courts. So far so good. The clauses simply speak to different
kinds of laws. Nor is there any difficulty in reconciling these clauses. It is simply a matter of identifying the type of law, as fitting either under one of these
clauses or under the other, and that is our essential task. It is the task, moreover, if just because, quite plainly, a law may be of either type (“a law prohibited” or “a law expressly authorized”) but it could hardly, at least at-one-andthe-same-time, be both.11
The necessary rub comes, however, when the act of Congress is concededly
one that does presume to “regulate” some aspect of commerce (among the several states), neither more nor less, and thus is utterly unexceptional (and unexceptionable) as plainly within the scope of the positive power thus conferred.
But the “commerce” thus “regulated” is itself a product, say, of “the press” (for
example, a book, a newspaper, a journal, or a leaflet), sent by freight or via
some other commercial medium from one state to addresses or recipients in
other states or abroad. And the manner in which the book (newspaper, leaflet,
etc.) is “regulated” is to forbid its participation in that commerce, such as it is.
So, now, what shall one do about that?
One easy, clean way of resolving this seeming (but perhaps merely “seeming”) problem is to resolve it directly and simply, that is, without any “clause
conflict,” and to do so in just the following way: to say that there frankly is no
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. In brief, merely to paraphrase the Amendment if just for suitable
emphasis: “Congress is granted no power, indeed, is hereby denied any power, to make any law
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.”
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. Indeed, for how can it be both? For to say that it is “both” is to say that it is “authorized” but
also that it is “forbidden,” though each is necessarily an exclusion of the other, and thus our assertion
would appear to be a mere contradiction in terms.
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conflict in the case just put. Rather, the conflict was utterly in one’s mind, and
it was a conflict wholly contrived. There is no conflict, we might well say,
because:
A. The act in question confines itself to regulating an aspect of
“commerce among the several states,” no less here, in a case where it
merely involves books, than in any other case (for example, a case
involving steel products, pork, beef, drugs, lottery tickets or kitchen
sinks); and
B. That the commerce is, or happens to be, “commerce in books,”
rather than “commerce in wheat,” or “commerce in steel,” may be
true—but being true, how does that bear upon the question? That is
to say, is there anything to suggest that the power thus expressly given
(“to regulate commerce . . . among the several states”) is given only in
respect to some kinds of commerce but not in respect to other kinds?
But what makes one imagine that that is so? Nothing on the face of the
clause so suggests. Nothing found elsewhere in the Constitution,
moreover, appears to do so either.12
May one yet complain that the act is nonetheless “void” or unenforceable
because it is a law made by Congress, and that this law, as made by Congress
(and applied as it is) is one that “abridg[es] the freedom of speech, or of the
press”? Yes, of course one may say this, but then, one may say anything one
likes. Saying it, in short, does not make it so. Moreover, the assertion that this
is just such a law, is, as such, merely what it appears to be: simply an assertion,
nothing more. One may even say straightforwardly that, taken as an assertion,
without something more to back it up, it assumes its own conclusion. It begs the
very question, in that it assumes that “the freedom of the press” extends to a
freedom of “marketing books in commerce among the states even when Congress forbids it to be done.” But does it? Why does one suppose that this is so?
Isn’t this the burden for the person so asserting? And if that person cannot discharge that burden, isn’t it obvious that they have no First Amendment claim
even to assert?
And, surely, this much is plainly right. Unless the freedom of the press
extends to, or includes, a freedom to engage in commercial trade (in books)
across state lines, even when Congress decides by law that it shall not be done,
we would say there is no conflict between what Congress has presumed to do on
the one hand, pursuant to the power to regulate commerce among the several
states, and what the First Amendment forbids on the other. So, let that be conceded as obviously correct.

12. “Nothing,” that is, including the First Amendment as well. The First Amendment obviously
does not declare that “Congress shall have no power to regulate commerce in books among the several
states.”
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Yet, if that much is so, so also may the obverse be equally true. If the freedom of the press does so extend, then the act of Congress must necessarily fail,
for by stipulation, that the act was conditionally, or even “apparently authorized” insofar as it regulates (an aspect of) “commerce among the several
states,” so it does not fail merely under the doctrine of enumerated powers,13 it
turns out not to be finally or “ultimately authorized” after all, but rather, “prohibited” instead, and prohibited because it runs afoul of the specific “prohibitory words” of the First Amendment which apply (even) in respect to every
power given to Congress, whatever that power may be.
In short, and quite consistent with this latter view, the “enactment” of the
First Amendment (that is, its proposal subsequent to ratification of the Constitution by more than two-thirds of the first Congress in 1789, and its swift ratification within two years by more than three-fourths of the states by 1791) signaled a rejection of Alexander Hamilton’s advice that no point would be served
by providing an express provision forbidding Congress to make any law
abridging the freedom of the press.14 Instead, the enactment of the First
Amendment, rejecting Hamilton’s counsel, meant expressly to put affirmative
restrictions on the “enumerated” powers of Congress (for example, those of
regulating commerce,15 of taxation,16 of spending,17 establishing a post office,18
13. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907) (“[T]he proposition that there are
legislative powers . . . not expressed in the grant of powers [to Congress], is in direct conflict with the
doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers.”); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
358, 396 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[U]nder a constitution conferring specific powers, the power
contended for must be granted, or it cannot be exercised.”); applied in Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82
(1879) (Holding act of Congress providing for registration of trademarks and civil and criminal
sanctions for infringers unconstitutional under the enumerated powers doctrine; the act could not be
sustained under the Copyright and Patent Clauses because both clauses required some degree of
creativity or invention, and many trademarks involved neither one; nor could it be sustained under the
Commerce Clause because, on its face, it reached trademarks not involved in any commerce “among
the several states” or “with foreign nations.”). In brief, the act failed for want of any power vested in
Congress pursuant to any of the enumerated powers given to Congress, whether in Article I, Section 8,
or elsewhere in the Constitution.
14. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513-15 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance,
should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which
restrictions may be imposed?”). Then, albeit in a manner seemingly very much at odds with what he
has just declared, Hamilton also went on to say: “What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any
definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and
from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution
respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of
the government. And here, after all . . . must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights.” Id. at
514.
15. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding congressional restrictions imposing
special requirements for posting and accessing “patently offensive” and “indecent” material on the
Internet an instrumentality of interstate and of foreign commerce, violates the First Amendment). See
also the discussion of Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002) in note 20 infra.
16. See, e.g., (albeit in these cases, state taxes), Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221
(1987) (holding four percent gross receipts tax exempting newspapers and some other publications, but
not “general interest” magazines, violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press);
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (same, re: two percent gross receipts tax from
advertising revenue of publications with more than 20,000 weekly circulation).
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etc.). Moreover, it did so with an expressed expectation that the courts would
honor those restrictions as such in cases where, though the act of Congress was
one otherwise clearly “within” the scope of some enumerated power, it nonetheless was not consistent with the First Amendment freedoms meant to be preserved from congressional abridgment. So, for example, Jefferson suggested
that “a declaration of rights,” once added as amendments to the Constitution,
would “put into the hands of the judiciary” a “legal check” against Congress
when popular sentiment flagged.19 And likewise, in summing up his reasons for
favoring the addition of amendments as a means of forestalling Congress from
using any of its enumerated powers in any way inconsistent with respect to the
rights and freedoms memorialized in these amendments, James Madison
observed: “If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals
of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those
rights . . . .”20
III
TENTATIVENESS IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
And all of this would seem to be quite correct, and quite convincing, too.
Unless, to be sure, just as there is a tentativeness in respect to whether, say, the
power “to regulate commerce among the several states” extends to a certain
thing, and Congress may not do so insofar as that power may be qualified in
some respect by some other provision (for example, a provision in the First
17. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Valasquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding congressionally
mandated restriction on use of grants provided pursuant to spending power for certain legal services by
grantee organizations inconsistent with, and forbidden by, the First Amendment).
18. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (holding act of Congress requiring
Postmaster to intercept and detain certain mail and then destroy it unless addressee registered an
affirmative request for its delivery violates the First Amendment).
19. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), reprinted in part in THE LIFE
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 462, 462-64 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden
eds., 1944).
20. Address by James Madison before the United States House of Representatives (June 8, 1789),
reprinted in V THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 370, 385 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904). See also I
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES pt. 2, app. at 29 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803) (“The danger
justly apprehended by those states which insisted that the federal government should possess no power,
directly or indirectly, over the subject, was, that those who were entrusted with the administration
might be forward in considering every thing as a crime against the government, which might operate to
their own personal disadvantage; it was therefore made a fundamental article of the federal compact,
that no such power should be exercised, or claimed by the federal government, leaving it to the state
governments to exercise such jurisdiction and control over the subject, as their several constitutions and
laws permit.”) (emphasis added); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (Marshall, C.J.)
(“These amendments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general
government . . . .”). For merely the most recent example of the Supreme Court applying the First
Amendment to strike down an act of Congress otherwise (that is, but for the First Amendment) plainly
within its enumerated power to enact pursuant to the commerce clause, see Thompson v. Western States
Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (holding void on its face a prohibition on consumer advertising of
“compounded” drugs—drugs lawful for pharmacies to prepare and to sell, pursuant to a physician’s
prescription, albeit drugs not submitted for FDA approval pursuant to rigorous FDA testing
requirements).
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Amendment) so that we cannot know what the power in the Commerce Clause
“finally” includes until we have determined what the First Amendment “keeps
back” from its ultimate reach, unless, I say, there is also a similar “tentativeness”
in respect to the First Amendment itself, a tentativeness, moreover, of just the
very same sort. A “tentativeness” we cannot resolve until we look even further
to see whether there is something some other clause recovers, or reserves (or
“keeps back”) from the First Amendment, even as we found in the First
Amendment in its “keep back” provision qualifying (that is, limiting) the power
given Congress to regulate commerce among the several states.
This possibility may strike us as unlikely, even as highly implausible, to be
sure. For what might such an additional provision having this effect look like,
or say?! That’s a fair question. Well, perhaps it could look like—and even
say—something very much like this:
The Congress shall have Power To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
And so, to the extent that Congress enacts legislation pursuant to such
power as it is so specifically granted within the four corners of this separate, distinct, freestanding clause, it—Congress—shall surely not be thought to have
made a law abridging “the freedom of the press.” We should surely say this, for
indeed, to say otherwise would seem now to construe the Constitution “against
itself,” that is, to read one clause (the First Amendment) to forbid that which
another clause (the Copyright Clause) expressly declares is quite all right to do.21
On this understanding, then, we should logically conclude, that if Congress has
acted “within” this clause, it has made no law that can be said to be a law
“abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Rather, it has merely made
a law that the Constitution itself deems compatible with the freedom of the
press, as it takes express care so straightforwardly to declare.
The logic of this position seems to me to be quite strong, even quite compelling, and it tends, I think, to explain why both commentators and courts still
exhibit some genuine uncertainty in this particular area of constitutional law. If
Congress has acted within (and not in excess) of whatever the scope of power
expressly granted it by this clause, then whatever provisions securing to the
authors the exclusive right to their respective writings are contained in affirmative legislation, insofar as those provisions are well grounded in the express
power as granted by this clause so to enact them, this clause (implicitly) declares

21. Namely, “to do” what? To do this: merely by legislation to secure to “authors and inventors,
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries,” neither more nor less; albeit, to be sure,
to secure those exclusive rights for “limited times,” rather than in perpetuity (as, without this limitation,
Congress might otherwise be inclined—but is not permitted—to do).
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that legislation not to be a law “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.”22
Of course, many eminently reasonable persons may well feel that proceeding in the manner that this clause provides Congress an authority to pursue
(namely, to secure “for limited Times to Authors and Inventors [an] exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”), may not be as effective as
proceeding by some other means, even to stimulate the production (and distribution) of “new” works. Indeed, some may feel that proceeding in this manner
may actually be far less effective—and far less conducive to the public good—
than proceeding in other ways. So, for example, they may reasonably believe
that proceeding instead by providing for “public subsidy” of authors, artists,
inventors and other creative people, without, however, granting them any
subsequent “exclusive right” to control, charge for, or limit copies (rather, the
incentive to be creative is the incentive of the subsidy thus provided—set at a
level one thinks just right to do its work well), will be the better recourse.
Discovery, creative work, etc., are thus “appropriately” encouraged and
stimulated—and the product at once becomes released into the public domain.
The system is superior by far, one may well conclude, better “balancing”
incentives for creative endeavors that also promptly enrich, and become a part
of, the public domain.
Such persons may well be right. And I’ll grant that they may well be.
Moreover, in their favor, we may note in passing that absolutely nothing in the
Constitution forbids that this means of “stimulating” “new knowledge” be pursued,23 even as we know it already is and, indeed, on a very large scale. Let it be
so. Moreover let it be admitted they may even be “right” in suggesting that the
22. The D.C. Circuit Court seems to treat the matter in just this way, although it is not entirely
clear. See, e.g., United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting a claim that
an FCC ban on broadcasters from carrying materials exclusively licensed by the copyright holder to
others was subject to some (minimal) measure of First Amendment review, and declaring that “the
[FCC] was correct to find that the rules are not subject to such scrutiny,” evidently meaning even
minimal, or weak, First Amendment scrutiny, and then explaining why in the following terms: “The
Constitution grants Congress the power to secure for limited times to authors the exclusive right to
their works, and this power generally supersedes the first amendment rights of those who wish to use
another’s copyrighted work.”) (emphasis added); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
cert. granted sub nom, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126, and cert. amended, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002)
(“[W]e held in United Video that copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under the First
Amendment.”) (emphasis added). Not that they may sometimes—or even usually—prevail against
challenges under the First Amendment, rather, that they are “categorically immune” from such
challenges.
23. The relevant enumerated power is merely the spending power in Article I, Section 8,
generously interpreted by the Supreme Court as conferring on Congress a virtually nonjusticiable
breadth of discretion to determine for itself what grants in aid, or appropriations from tax revenues, are
sufficiently consistent with providing for the “general Welfare of the United States,” as to be within its
authority under this clause. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 156 (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., 1996) (citing
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976), and
quite accurately summarizing: “[G]reat deference is judicially accorded Congress’ decision that a
spending program advances the general welfare, and the Court has suggested that the question whether
a spending program provides for the general welfare may not even be judicially noticeable.”)
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manner in which the Copyright Clause proceeds is not only not the “best” way,
but may in some measure even be a “dysfunctional” way, in that it, and Congress by employing it, may miss the “proper balance” between the end (stimulation and distribution of new knowledge) and the means (vesting exclusive
rights, of “monopoly” control, in the author for a rather lengthy—albeit “limited”—period of years).
But we may also properly note that if Congress wishes to agree with us, it
may not merely modify and trim back the protection its sundry copyright laws
now (too generously?) enact. Rather, it may repeal them in part or in whole,
indeed, repeal them all, and then just go forward to “substitute” wholly public
subsidy means of stimulating creativity, the products of which would at once
“drop” into the public domain. In short, it is open to Congress even now to
agree with Thomas Macaulay that vesting copyrights in the “creator-monopolist” is, or may be, in some manner of speaking, a highly undesirable “tax on
knowledge,”24 a “tax” levied in such amount as each “author” (given exclusive
rights by statute) decides to extract for anyone’s right to copy his or her work,
or any part thereof, payable to himself or herself, albeit a “tax” of a sort that, in
a sense, merely provides delayed compensation for the author’s creative work
(and contribution to the public fund of knowledge).25 Maybe the “tax” allowed
thus to be imposed (by each author or by those to whom he assigned his right to
determine the conditions of copying his or her work) is “too high,” maybe not.
But that is up to Congress to determine, as it does by setting the metes and
bounds of the author’s “exclusive” rights, consistent with its enumerated power
to do so, as conferred by this clause. Our objections to the manner in which it
works out the calculus, however, are, at this level, merely political objections
(for example, we think it succumbed to utterly false representations by various
corporate copyright interests), not constitutional ones, as long as it is clear that
however Congress worked things out, it nonetheless stayed within the “four
corners” of the power confided to it by this clause.26

24. Thomas B. Macaulay, A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in VIII
THE LIFE AND WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 201 (London, Longmans, Green, and Co. 1897).
25. For discussion (and references to other cases) elaborating this view, see, for example, Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). “[I]t should not be forgotten that
the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable
right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas.” Id.
26. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196-97 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (addressing this same sort
of issue as it may be raised in respect to how Congress uses is power “to regulate commerce . . . among
the several states”). Marshall eschewed any role for the judiciary in second-guessing the wisdom of an
act of Congress, even respecting the extremes of congressional use of its various enumerated powers:
This power [referring in the particular instance to the power to “regulate commerce . . . among
the several states”], like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution. . . . The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people,
and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other
instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied,
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The point remains, that if it did stay within those four corners of authorized
law-making, its act cannot then be said to be invalid under the First Amendment. For, again, “the First Amendment provision on ‘the freedom of the
press’ should not be interpreted or applied to forbid what the Copyright Clause
itself expressly permits.”
The question is, where is the flaw, or fundamental error, if there be one, in
this reasoning?
IV
PERPETUATING UNCHECKABLE PLURALISM
Perhaps it resides in the following different, and more constrained, view of
what the Copyright Clause is about—that what it is about, essentially, is pretty
much just this and nothing more.
We noted already that the Constitution takes care to provide a power in
Congress to “regulate commerce among the states,” albeit a power all do concede is itself subject to First Amendment limitations in respect to how that
power may, in turn, be used by Congress. And we know that that power was
provided in order to enable the national legislature to establish uniform norms
in respect to the commerce to which the power attaches (“commerce among the
states”), in order that such commerce as this must not be left to such differing
regimes as each state might presume to enact; rather, it was to be dealt with as
the national legislature should feel disposed so to do.
But, at the time, neither this new and express power (to “regulate commerce
among the states”) nor any other proposed enumerated power would per se
grant—or was seen as granting—to Congress an authority to establish a uniform
rule in respect to what was patentable or not, or what was subject to copyright
or not, and nationally established exclusive “ownership” rules of a like sort.
And, indeed, absent establishing a separate power, distinctly entrusting to Congress an authority so to provide, then all such “rules” would be whatever rules
(however conflicting and differing) one would find by consulting the patchwork
statute books, and common law, of each particular state.27
The manifest undesirability of perpetuating this uncheckable pluralism, that
is, that the extent to which an author’s work could or could not lawfully at once
be copied (and such copies sold by the copier) would just depend upon what
each state legislature—or the common law of the state—might provide, is what
“drives” (that is, essentially accounts for) the provision in Article I. And, in
brief, the provision in the clause stands in relation to its particular subject, in the
same way that the commerce power stands in relation to its subject in turn. It is
to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people most often rely
solely, in all representative governments.
Id.
27. At least, that is, all such rules as would be beyond the reach of Congress to preempt merely by
its (limited) power to regulate “commerce” among the several states.
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meant to empower Congress to provide a pre-emptive uniformity of law, in
respect to the subject embraced by the clause (and to the extent the subject is
embraced by the clause), thus pre-empting what would, absent use of this power
by Congress, be the varying kinds of laws controlling within each state.28
But note as to such laws (that is, state laws, statutory or common), we would
not doubt that each, whatever its particular scope, and whatever its provisions,
would be subject to full First Amendment review.29 So, for example, supposing
there were no federal copyright law in the field30 and that, in North Carolina,
the legislature provided by statute that:
N.C.G.S. §2001. No one shall within 120 years of its publication, make
any copy, or distribute or sell any copy, of an author’s original work, in
whole or in any part, absent written permission or license granted by
the author, his assigns, or his heirs.
We would not doubt that the North Carolina act would be subject to full First
Amendment review in an appropriate case pressing the issue. To be sure,
depending upon how one might add certain features to this North Carolina

28. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 681-84 (1834). The Court noted that under
the Articles of Confederation, the most that Congress could do was to recommend to the several states
certain measures securing to authors and publishers exclusive copyrights for “not less than fourteen
years.” Some states adopted variable statutes on the subject (some of which provided protection for
authors who were citizens of other states only if the state of their citizenship reciprocated by providing
a like protection), while other states applied varying understandings of common law rights. The Court
concluded that “under the existing governments of the United States, before the adoption of the
present constitution, adequate protection could not be given to authors throughout the United States,
by any general law.” Id. at 684. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (Madison, after quoting the proposed, separate constitutional clause on “authors
and inventors,” proceeds to explain it: “The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The
copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The
right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully
coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual
provision for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws
passed at the instance of Congress.”) (emphasis added); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 558, 402-03 (Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1883) (“It is
beneficial . . . to authors and inventors, because, otherwise, they would be subjected to the varying laws
and systems of the different states on this subject . . . .”). Moreover, that the commerce power was not
regarded as per se sufficient to grant this kind of pre-emptive power to Congress, incidentally, is merely
well reflected in the Supreme Court’s holding later on, in the original Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82
(1879), holding that the act of Congress did not meet the requirements of the Copyright Clause,
because a “trademark” as such may represent no original creativity at all but may merely borrow a
familiar image or figure to use, to identify one’s product, and neither could it alternatively be sustained
under the commerce power, because it presumed to extend to trademarks identified to goods and
services whether or not involved in commerce among the several states.
29. Well, strictly speaking, Fourteenth Amendment review (but “Fourteenth Amendment” review
applying full First Amendment standards). See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941)
(Black, J.) (“Not until 1925 . . . did this Court recognize in the Fourteenth Amendment the application
to the states of the same standards of freedom of expression as, under the First Amendment, are
applicable to the federal government.”) (emphasis added).
30. As there might not be, indeed, if no power were given to Congress to enact such legislation
(and, of course, the Commerce Clause power were itself not understood to be sufficiently far-reaching
to enable Congress simply to rely upon it).
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statute (for example, a long list of “exceptions,” with respect to which no permission need be sought before one made copies and either sold or simply gave
them away), perhaps the act could be sustained. We need not tarry to see
whether that might be so.
But we have said enough to show plainly where this discussion must now
carry us. The clause in Article I is meant to (and certainly does) empower Congress to preempt that North Carolina statute, indeed, to provide a uniformity of
law to control, within the field of the subject thus expressly confided to its preemptive power, as both described and boundaried in the four corners of the
clause setting it forth. But it does no more work than this work. That is, the
power thus vested in Congress now “stands in lieu of” the swath of legislative
power formerly held, severally, in the states. It is a power enabling Congress to
set the norms to govern the field covered by the clause, in lieu of, or in exclusion of, different regimes within each state. Whatever each of those regimes
might be (or might have been), obviously each would yet have to “answer” to
the First Amendment (as applied to each state and in each state, through the
Fourteenth Amendment). And so, likewise, whatever regime Congress enacts
within its authority so to preempt this field from the states in such degree as it is
inclined to do—and indeed is given power so to do by this clause—is itself in
turn answerable to the First Amendment. And as much as this, then, is true of
every part, section, word, and punctuation point of the current act as well.
The point here, then, is that just as the Commerce Clause provision
“answers” Federalism questions but not First Amendment questions, the same
is exactly true in respect to the Copyright Clause as well. When Congress acts
“within” the clause (generously,31 albeit not too generously32 construed), that
31. “Generously” (rather than grudgingly, or narrowly), in merely the same manner as befits the
construction of each other enumerated power provided in the Constitution, that is, in the “federalism”
understanding of the clause. In this regard, the “federalism” regard, for the Court to construe the clause
more grudgingly than, say, the Court has construed the Commerce Clause, or the Spending Clause, or
Tax Clause, in respect to each of their respective “fields” of national legislative discretion of
“enactment authority,” would be wholly misplaced, and it would merely raise a fair question of its own
bias were it to presume to do so (that is, in picking and choosing among clauses, reading “generously”
those clauses providing authority for kinds of acts of Congress it—the Court—may think desirable to
have Congress enjoy a suitable power to enact, but less generously those clauses providing authority for
other kinds of acts of Congress to which the Court is somehow itself frankly opposed (and thus inclined
to find no suitable power granted to Congress to enact)). Simply to provide a single example: That
“motion pictures” (“movies”) are regarded as within the discretion of Congress to qualify for copyright
protection may certainly seem to stretch the meaning of a critical term as it appears in Article I, Section
8, in the crucial clause granting the power to benefit “authors” in respect to their “writings” (for few
persons would straightforwardly and ordinarily describe a motion picture as itself a “writing”). Still, it
is not remarkable, given the general understanding of the place and the purpose of the clause—any
more than it is remarkable that the Supreme Court has systematically accepted “movies” as equally
within the understanding of “speech” embraced by the First Amendment as well. See Kingsley Int’l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952). So, quaintly but sensibly, even “silent” movies may be “writings” on the one hand (for
copyright purposes) and “speech” (for First Amendment purposes) on the other hand as well.
32. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (noting some discernible creativity, some modicum of originality, must
characterize a qualifying work).
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puts to rest any question respecting the controlling authority of its act vis-à-vis
that of some inconsistent, or incongruent state or local law. It answers the “federalism question.” It answers no other question, however, any more than in a
Commerce Clause case, and none arising under the First Amendment as such.
The proposition is easily tested, simply by supposing that the act Congress
adopted were of the extreme sort illustrated by our hypothetical North Carolina
law. Reproducing it here, as an act of Congress, may aid us to see how that is
so:
___ U.S.C. §2001. No one shall within 120 years of its publication,
make any copy, or distribute or sell any copy, of an author’s original
work, in whole or in any part, absent written permission or license
granted by the author, his assigns, or his heirs.
The act “fits” snugly and well just as it appears, as to be clearly within the tight
phrasing of the relevant clause in Article I. And it does so, though it provides
no exceptions whatever, in particular no exceptions of “fair use” (for example,
copying and republishing some part of an author’s original work without the
author’s permission, in the course of producing a published, highly critical,
review of the author’s opus). The omission of such a “permitted” exception
obviously does not put the adoption of the statute “beyond” the power of Congress to enact it (for nothing in the clause suggests that any such “exception”
need be provided for). Plainly, just as it is, it appears to be easily within the
boundaries of the authorizing constitutional clause.33
So much being conceded, however, it does not answer to the First Amendment in the least. When the author seeks to invoke his right, exactly in keeping
with the terms of the act, against the person who, without his permission, presumed to copy a part of his or her work, albeit “merely” incidental to writing
and publishing a critical review, the infringer will “lift up” the First Amendment
as his or her “shield,” rather than invoke anything within the act. And it is virtually beyond controversy that the First Amendment would readily shield a
33. Nor could the decision of Congress not to make any exception for securing the author’s
permission to copy and reprint “selected lines” or “paragraphs,” etc., by one who seeks to use the
copied portions “merely” within the body of some critical review of the author’s work, be thought to be
inconsistent in some way with the essential purpose of the Copyright Clause as such. To the contrary.
Authorship as such would surely be more encouraged by assuring to each original author that no one,
without their permission, could cull, quote, and copy selected parts of their original work as part of a
critical review, the publication of which may well impair (or even destroy) the market for their work, as
well as bring them into a discouraging and depressing disrepute. In brief, authorship is clearly
encouraged by confiding to each author the “exclusive right to their respective writings,” allowing each
to ration downstream licensed copiers in exactly such manner as each author believes will best promote
his or her work. Of course, such strengthened copyright protection could not forestall critical reviews
as such, but it would nonetheless assure authors that spiteful critics could not, without their consent,
presume to use their own words “against” them, or cull, elide, and thus (by selective quotation)
misrepresent the excellence of their work by that device. So, to that extent, each prospective author
may be encouraged and comforted by being assured, by act of Congress, that without their consent, no
rival, or self-promoting critic, or other person, may make any copy, or use any copy, or publish any
copy, of any part of their work, without their consent (on such terms as they, as author, deem best).
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critic’s use of quoted parts of an author’s work, quite without the author’s consent, to give both example and point to the review in concrete form, that no
mere paraphrase could manage to do. Insofar as the copyright holder relied on
the act of Congress, in brief, the action would fail not because the act was
improperly invoked, but because it was useless to serve as a basis for suing to
enjoin, or to seek damages, for the knowingly copied and republished portions
of the author’s work. “Useless” because the First Amendment will not permit
Congress to grant to authors a true monopoly power over even their “own”
works—despite the appearance on the face of the clause exactly as it appears in
Article I, even when the unconsented-to uses may well destroy both the market
for their work, and pretty well destroy their own repute and incentives for
future authorship as well. Some may find this folly and paradox. Others, however, will understand, and celebrate it as part of the American view of the
meaning of freedom of speech and of the press.34
V
CONCLUSION
Here, we have but tried to put the matter in some repose merely on the
early question of how to regard the clause itself, as to whether it “excepts” a
certain area of legislation from the First Amendment. It does not. The clause,
again, is meant to put an end to one more kind of federalism question, and on
that front, it deserves to be generously interpreted and applied in what it may
confide to the discretion of Congress to legislate as it thinks best to do, in preemption of various regimes that might otherwise riddle the field. It “preempts” nothing within the protection of the First Amendment, however, and
any feature of any portion of any act Congress has, or may in the future, provide under sanction of this clause, may always be brought into question
respecting whether, on its face or as applied, it offends against the larger freedom of speech and of the press provided constitutional sanctuary in the First
Amendment still unfolding in the United States.

34. For two excellent, contemporary examples of cases in which, were the “fair use” provisions of
the current act not interpreted themselves to permit the infringing uses at stake, the First Amendment
itself might easily have compelled the same result, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994), concerning commercial parody of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman,” and Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986), where the “infringing” party copied and
distributed in excess of 700,000 copies of the particular original work (a parody cartoon), without the
copyright holder’s consent. See also 71 U.S.L.W. 3258 (Oct. 15, 2002) (reporting oral argument of Oct.
9, 2002, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618) (“O’Connor pointed out that the Supreme Court on several
occasions has avoided the invocation of the First Amendment in copyright cases.” It has indeed done
just this, by managing to “interpret” the fair use provisions to deny the relief sought by the copyright
holder against the infringing use.) And for a near-equivalent case, involving a state law (akin to
copyright, but based on a state tort law notion of “right of publicity” for commercial gain, and a
Lanham Act claim), where it is strongly arguable First Amendment should have protected the “copied”
features of the plaintiff’s persona, despite the circuit court’s (majority) view, see White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).

